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In order to be effective, secure systems need to be both correct 
(i.e. effective when used as intended) and dependable (i.e. 
actually being used as intended). Given that most secure systems 
involve people, a strategy for achieving dependable security must 
address both people and technology. Current research in Human-
Computer Interactions in Security (HCISec) aims to increase 
dependability of the human element by reducing mistakes (e.g. 
through better user interfaces to security tools).  We argue that a 
successful strategy also needs to consider the impact of social 
interaction on security, and in this respect trust is a central 
concept. We compare the understanding of trust in secure 
systems with the more differentiated models of trust in social 
science research. The security definition of “trust” turns out to 
map onto strategies that would be correctly described as 
“assurance” in the more differentiated model. We argue that 
distinguishing between trust and assurance yields a wider range 
of strategies for ensuring dependability of the human element in 
a secure socio-technical system. Furthermore, correctly placed 
trust can also benefit an organisation’s culture and performance. 
We conclude by presenting design principles to help security 
designers decide “when to trust” and “when to assure”, and give 
examples of how both strategies would be implemented in 
practice.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of security is to identify risks, and devise 
countermeasures that effectively mitigate the risks to the assets 
of a system. Security countermeasures are traditionally 
distinguished into avoidance, deterrence, prevention, detection, 
reaction and insurance.  
To counter threats effectively, however, any countermeasure has 
to function correctly and be dependable. We define the two 
properties as follows: 
• Correctness: the designed countermeasures will 
neutralise the threat if working as intended. 
• Dependability: the degree to which designed 
countermeasures are working as intended. 
 
“A computer is secure if you can depend on it and its software to 
behave as you expect” [10]. Although this definition is open to 
debate (because it implies that security exists in the reader’s 
expectations of computer and software behaviour), it is useful to 
highlight the importance of dependability in computer security. It 
has been argued that an emerging sentiment in security research 
is “correctness” is not the issue; “dependability” is’ [5]. The 
point is that the ability to know how the system is going to 
behave is now being recognised as very important, in addition to 
building a system that actually counters threats. 
 
A secure system is part of a wider socio-technical system whose 
goal is the achievement of a production task [1, 6, 25, 29]. A 
socio-technical system has both human and technical components 
working together to achieve production tasks, as well as 
achieving the enabling task of securing that system effectively 
[6]1. Dependability is therefore determined by the degree to 
which this socio-technical system behaves in the way it is 
expected to. Technical components are designed, and their 
behaviour is easier to predict then that of the human element. 
(Though technical systems created by putting together several 
sub-systems can exhibit unexpected emergent behaviours.) 
However, the effectiveness of social engineering attacks [17], 
and reports of people’s failure to comply with organisational 
security policies, demonstrate that the behaviour of the social 
element of a secure system is currently much less dependable.  
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It is often assumed that one way of increasing the dependability 
of the security in a system is to limit the role that people have in 
that secure system, using technical countermeasures to replace 
the human element because they are seen to be more dependable. 
Governments, for instance, currently deploy biometric systems 
because they are better at detecting an individual presenting a 
passport that is not theirs.  However, replacing people by 
technology is not feasible, nor is it always desirable: people may 
function less reliably on some tasks, but they are also more 
flexible, and often perform multiple functions. Thus, removing 
the human element may weaken the overall security.  [27], for 
instance, describes how a US border control officer identified a 
would-be terrorist – who had his own passport and was not under 
suspicion – because she detected abnormal behaviour 
“something about him just wasn’t right”. Table 1 shows that 
there are technical and social countermeasures for every 
dimension of security (prevention, detection, reaction and 
deterrence). While the number of technical solutions is 
increasing, they cannot be expected to fully replace social 
countermeasures. 
Technical countermeasures, if selected and configured correctly, 
perform well on repetitive security tasks, such as access control, 
virus checking or integrity checking. They become less effective 
in less well-defined security tasks, such as anomaly detection 
(i.e. intrusion detection), and detecting hitherto unknown 
undesirable events, or their pre-cursors. People, although lacking 
the accuracy and being prone to fatigue and boredom, can be very 
flexible and extremely effective – especially since deterrence 
tends to be a social mechanism (for example prosecution and 
jail). A design strategy for a secure socio-technical system must 
be to use the strengths of both components, and avoid their 
weaknesses. 
Another point to consider is that people in a socio-technical 
system are not static components – people evolve, and interact to 
form social subsystems. Security designers may consider the 
capacity to evolve a negative characteristic, since it means the 
behaviour of the human element is not consistent – e.g. an 
employee who has complied with security policies for many years 
can suddenly “turn bad” if his circumstances change or and 
exceptional temptation arises. At the same time, since most 
organisations operate in a constantly changing environment, the 
human ability to evolve is a necessary condition for their 
survival.  
The interactions between people in any system are governed by 
social norms – rules by which people behave – and based on 
values – people’s beliefs, for instance, about what is right and 
what is wrong. Norms can evolve in social systems over time, or 
can be designed.  Law and security policies are examples of 
designed norms that govern behaviour.  Norms that are not 
formalised, but are pervasive (common to most social systems) 
have evolved and are widely adhered to because, over time, they 
have turned out to be of advantage for the long-term survival of 
the system. 
A prime example of such a norm is trust.  In social sciences and 
economics, trust has been researched extensively over the past 4 
decades. The resulting, widely accepted definition of trust is “an 
attitude of positive expectation that one’s vulnerabilities will not 
be exploited” [4, 21].  The idea of “willingness to be 
vulnerable”, as opposed to deploying a countermeasure, may 
initially appear to be anathema in the context of security.  But it 
is worth noting that – in terms of well-established thinking in 
systems theory and social sciences – such a norm would not have 
evolved unless it was beneficial to the long-term survival of 
systems.  There is ample evidence of the economic benefits of 
trust: high-trust systems are much more expensive to operate 
than low-trust ones [11]. This economic benefit is largely due to 
two factors: 
1) Devising and operating countermeasures for every 
vulnerability is expensive.  If two parties trust each other 
and neither party breaks the trust, they both lower their cost 
of interaction.   
2) Trust is a pre-condition for the creation of social capital in 
systems.  Social capital means that people in an 
organisation have shared values and a shared sense of 
responsibility for the well-being of a system, which reduces 
selfish behaviour and carelessness. 
Given that security is there to ensure long-term survival of a 
system, the potential benefits of trust as defined in social science 
and economics are intriguing.   
In security, on the other hand, trust is currently defined as a 
“system or component […] whose failure can break the security 
policy” [3].  This definition sees trust as a characteristic of a 
component, whereas in social sciences, it is a property of the 
system that forms as a result of interaction between agents of that 
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Table 1. Technical and Social countermeasures 
system. The security definition also implies that failure of such a 
component must be avoided, i.e. any risk to the dependability of 
the component must be mitigated. Human trust, however, means 
not mitigating the dependability risk that arises from the 
vulnerability. The security perspective is one of assurance – 
rather than trusting that the vulnerability will not be exploited. A 
“trusted system” is traditionally seen as one that is well secured, 
meaning that all known vulnerabilities have been removed or 
counteracted through security measures. 
We argue in the remainder of the paper that both assurance and 
trust have a role to play in the design of a secure socio-technical 
system. Firstly, using both strategies, each in its rightful place, 
improves the economics of a secure system – trusting is cheaper, 
as long as that trust is well-placed, i.e. not exploited too often. 
Secondly, trust can actually improve the dependability of the 
human component, because it fosters the development of shared 
values and responsibility, and increases vigilance and the 
motivation to comply. Thirdly, a more detailed understanding of 
assurance and trust can help to design more effective assurance 
mechanisms, because the reduction of trust that usually 
accompanies heavy-duty assurance mechanisms can be 
counteracted through organisational design measures.  Finally, 
this perspective gives designers a richer understanding of the 
vulnerabilities that affect the dependability of the human element 
of a socio-technical system, and puts a wider range of 
countermeasures at their disposal.  
 
In the next section, we present a brief overview of some of the 
current research in the Human-Computer Interactions in Security 
(HCISec) community. We then present a detailed account of how 
trust relationships are built between actors (whether human or 
not), and what key factors foster well-placed trust. We will then 
present a discussion as to how trust and security factors can work 
together in order to make people more dependable in their 
application of security policies, and therefore less likely to 
become unwitting victims of social engineering attacks. We 
conclude by calling for more research into this area and introduce 
a number of design principles that may favour well-placed trust 
between organisations and their employees, as well as fostering a 
trusting environment within the organisation. 
2. PEOPLE AND SECURITY 
Kahn [13], cited by Anderson [2], “attributes the Russian 
disasters of World War 1 to the fact that their soldiers found the 
more sophisticated army cipher systems too hard to use, and 
reverted to using simple systems which the Germans could solve 
without great difficulty”. This statement seems to expound the 
notion that good security is hard to use. 
Bruce Schneier [26], however, makes the point that “security is 
only as good as its weakest link, and people are the weakest link 
in the chain”, indicating that good security has to acknowledge 
the weaknesses of people. Other authors [1, 12, 17, 18, 30] also 
argue that secure systems are broken through human issues, such 
as bad security configuration. They state that ease of use is 
necessary in order to get people to behave securely, and that good 
security is not necessarily hard to use [1]. 
Consequently, the whole field of HCISec is largely focussed on 
building better tools [8, 28] and improving the user interfaces to 
these tools [12, 30]. This will undoubtedly improve the usability 
of security tools, and in turn improve security. However, we also 
believe that improving the user interface is only one of many 
changes designers have to make to improve the dependability of 
the human element in secure socio-technical systems. 
 
When Saltzer and Schroeder in 1975 identified the need for 
‘psychological acceptability’ [23] in secure systems, they were 
referring to the need for better interfaces. However, 
psychological acceptability extends beyond user interfaces 
because a secure system is acceptable if the user cost (i.e. the 
sum total of the psychological, cognitive and physical load 
required of a user in a given task) of using it is not excessive 
compared to the user benefits (i.e. the incentives and advantages 
of engaging in a given task). This goes beyond the security user 
interface, and affects the user in the wider context of system use.  
As mentioned above, in most organisations security is a 
secondary, enabling task, ensuring the continuity of the primary 
production task [24]. One of the costs of security is how much it 
will interfere with production tasks. Possible benefits of applying 
security might be avoiding penalties, or peer acceptance into a 
particular “security conscious” group. In organisations that 
prioritise productivity whenever there is a conflict with security, 
and which do not penalise those who break security policies, or 
reward those that do comply, the cost of applying security for an 
individual is high compared with the benefits. Unsurprisingly, 
people involved in the security of such organisations are less 
likely to behave as intended.  
3. TRUST 
What role does trust play in improving the dependability of the 
human element in socio-technical systems? The term ‘trust’ is 
frequently used in the security literature – for example when 
referring to trusted paths and trust chains. In contrast to this, as 
stated in the introduction, social science research defines trust 
“an attitude of positive expectation that one’s vulnerabilities will 
not be exploited.” [15, 16, 22]  
 
A useful starting point when looking at the role trust plays in 
security is to identify which factors influence an actor’s decision 
to engage in a trust relationship. (Actors can be people, but also 
organisations, institutions, and job roles – such as bank clerks, 
couriers or policemen). A trust relationship is only required when 
risk and uncertainty are present, i.e. when actors stand to lose 
something. At the same time, the trustor often expects to realise 
a gain if the transaction is successful. These factors can be 
observed in eCommerce transactions, where the customer pays 
the vendor in the expectation that the vendor will send the 
desired goods – which are often available at a lower price than 
from traditional retailers or unavailable locally. The customer 
cannot ensure compliance from the vendor and has to trust that 
they will keep their side of the bargain. The vendor, on the other 
hand, has the option to default on sending the goods and a 
number of factors can influence this decision.  
Figure 1 from the research presented in [21], illustrates the 
factors which determine the mechanics of trust between a trustor 
(i.e. trusting actor) and a trustee (i.e. trusted actor). It consists of 
a number of factors that affect how trust is signalled, how these 
signals are understood and how they affect a given trust relation. 
The main factors consist of: 
 Intrinsic properties 
o Motivation, Ability, Internalised Norms 
and Benevolence 
 Contextual properties 
o Temporal, Social and Institutional 
embeddedness. 
Both contextual and intrinsic properties play a role in the 
establishment of a trust relationship. Intrinsic properties refer to 
factors that are internal to the trustor and trustee, such as the 
propensity to take risks, the benefits of engaging in a trust 
relationship and the personal cost of breaking trust. Contextual 
properties refer to factors that exist outside both actors, such as 
law enforcement, expectations of future interactions or 
reputation. 
A further important distinction to introduce at this stage is that 
between trust and reliance.  Trust governs the early exchanges 
between a specific trustor and trustee. With repeated successful 
exchanges, the trusting stance – i.e. where the trustor is 
conscious of his vulnerability – is replaced by an expectation – or 
reliance – that the trustee will behave in a trustworthy manner. 
That is to say the trustor does not consider himself as vulnerable 
any more.  The distinction is important because attacks on the 
human element in secure systems that exploit reliance differ 
from those that exploit trust. 
3.1 Intrinsic Properties 
3.1.1 Trustor: Motivation 
Motivation refers to an actor’s incentive for engaging in a trust 
relationship. It is affected by factors such as propensity to trust, 
perception of risk, benefits of engaging in the relationship and 
the availability of other options that may achieve similar results. 
These are subjective characteristics that vary betweens actors. 
Propensity to trust relates to the trustor’s inclination to be 
trusting – some people are more inclined to be trusting, for 
instance for fear of offending the trustee by not doing so. [17] 
present many examples of social engineering attacks which 
exploit this. 
The perception of the risk of engaging in a trust relationship 
refers to the potential for loss – not only financial, but also for 
example the psychological cost of having been naïve, or having 
been duped by attackers. The propensity for risk, again, differs 
from person to person, and some people break security policies 
simply because they enjoy taking risks; interestingly, most people 
are less likely to take risks on behalf of others [29]. 
Benefits capture what the actor stands to gain from a successful 
trust relationship, such as financial profit, a reduction in 
cognitive effort, time saving, etc. In security, there are examples 
of people disclosing passwords in exchange for a reward such as 
chocolate bar2, or giving access to their computer to a person that 
offers to fix a purported problem [17]. Finally, a critical factor as 
to whether actors engage in a trust relationship is whether these 
properties can be detected – i.e. if individuals perceive there is 
no benefit, they will not be motivated. 
3.1.2 Trustor: Ability 
For the trustor, this refers to the individual knowledge and 
understanding of the signals and situations that affect the 
formation of a trust relationship. For example, a trustor’s 
assessment of the risk inherent in a given trust relationship is 
affected by past experience as well as new knowledge. An 
employee may be happy leaving their PC screen unlocked when a 
maintenance person is in the office, but may change this 
behaviour if subsequently customer data was found to have been 
downloaded from that PC. 
3.1.3 Trustee: Ability 
Ability refers to the trustee’s ability to actually achieve a given 
task. The trustee may be willing but unable to actually perform 
in the manner expected. For instance, many people may be 
willing to keep separate passwords for different systems, until 
they find they are unable to recall them when necessary, and then 
resort to breaking security policies [25]. Unrealistic expectations 
of people’s ability to behave in a dependable manner can also 
reduce dependability in a wider sense: security policies that 
require the impossible create resentment and lower people’s 
general willingness to comply with security policies, i.e. it 
reduces their motivation to be dependable [1]. 
3.1.4 Trustee: Motivation: Internalised Norms 
Actors have been observed to behave in a trustworthy manner 
despite not having any external incentive to do so. Partly this can 
be put down to habit, but also to internalised norms that affect 
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that actor. These norms can induce the actor to behave in an 
untrustworthy manner, for selfish actors motivated only by 
immediate gain. They can also induce the actor to behave in a 
trustworthy manner, a trait that can be referred to as integrity:“… 
the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds 
acceptable.” [15]. For example, some people based on their 
upbringing, are more diligent in following the rules. 
The most immediate application of this understanding to security 
is that most people do not break a trust relationship lightly.  If 
employees interpret being given access to a system as being 
trusted to look after an organisational asset, their internalised 
norms can create a barrier to breaking that trust.  Security 
policies that do not explain countermeasures in terms of 
protection of assets, but try to assure behaviours by threatening 
sanctions, on the other hand, do not have this effect (see also 
section 3.3). 
People act on internalised norms based, for instance, on their 
upbringing. This is important to consider for two reasons (1) 
because people are likely to violate security policies that demand 
behaviour that conflicts with their internalised norms, and (2) 
because some attacks play on internalised norms.  [29] provides 
an interesting example of the first category: a company’s security 
policy stated that employees must lock their screens whenever 
leaving their desks.  In small offices shared by 2-3 people, 
locking your screen whenever you left your desk was interpreted 
by co-workers as a sign that they were not trusted.  Rather then 
jeopardise relationships with their co-workers, employees 
preferred to break the security policy. 
When security policies conflict with internalised norms, security 
designers need to manage the conflict.  In the financial sector, for 
instance, there are many examples where individual employees 
are not trusted, e.g. no single employee can open the safe.  If 
company employees understand that this policy is necessary to 
comply with external regulations, or to protect the reputation of 
the organisation, it de-personalises the fact that employees are 
not trusted to open the safe, making it clear that the lack of trust 
is “business not personal”. 
[17] provides examples of attacks that exploit internalised norms, 
either by pretending to be a co-worker in need of help, or by 
someone in authority, and who are therefore to be trusted.  Many 
email scams and phishing attacks use the same approach.  A 
good strategy for increasing dependability of employees in the 
face of such attacks is to institute simple, reliable rules for 
mutual authentication, and a supportive point of contact for no-
fault reporting and clarifying rules. 
Many professions, such as medicine, instil norms in their 
practitioners and organisations should consider promoting a set 
of norms that supports their security goals. An example of such a 
norm is “our customers entrust their data and privacy to us, and 
we have a shared responsibility to protect them at all times”.  
Consistent promotion of such norms can lead to them taking 
priority over other internalised norms, at least in the 
organisational context (see section 3.3).  
3.1.5 Trustee: Motivation: Benevolence 
“Human behaviour in romantic relationships is an example of 
trustworthy action motivated by strong feelings of benevolence. 
In such relationships the well-being of the other forms part of 
one’s own gratification. Benevolence – albeit to a lesser degree – 
also applies to relationships between work colleagues or 
friends” [21]. In relationships of benevolence, actors do not 
expect immediate or equal returns, but this sentiment only 
evolves over time, and after a number of successful trust 
exchanges. This factor can be crucial in breaking security policy, 
[17] presents several examples of how social engineering 
attackers groom their targets by appearing to be benevolent – e.g. 
selflessly helping to fix a problem on the target’s PC (which, of 
course, the attacker has created in the first place), and exploiting 
the resulting trust relationship. Social engineering relies on the 
target’s benevolence and willingness to be helpful in order to 
break policies. 
3.2 Contextual Properties 
3.2.1 Temporal embeddedness 
This is the notion that two actors’ decision to engage in a trust 
relationship is affected by their expectation of future interactions. 
This is one of the reasons why, for example, many disgruntled 
employees are willing to vandalise and cause damage to systems 
they have access to, since they have no expectations of future 
interactions with their employers. Some organisations have “exit 
protocols” that make sure that people who are leaving the 
organisation cannot exploit trust that was extended to them as 
employees.  In most organisations, however, there is no 
systematic checking that all access to systems has been removed, 
for instance, that any shared passwords have been changed.  
Similarly, people are often not made aware that meeting former 
colleagues in a social context can lead to disclosure of sensitive 
information. 
3.2.2 Social embeddedness 
Social embeddedness represents the group interactions and 
ensuing reputation that an actor gains from his behaviour towards 
members of that group. The incentive to behave in a trustworthy 
manner is no longer linked to future interactions with a single 
actor, but to future interactions with actors likely to hear of their 
reputation. Within organisations, this can be a powerful 
motivator for a newcomer to conform to the existing security 
behaviours (or lack thereof) inside their immediate peer group. 
[29] reports that newcomers’ behaviour with respect to security 
policies invariably follows that of members of their immediate 
work team, even when they have undergone security training as 
part of their induction.  The desire to “fit in” the immediate work 
environment is usually stronger.  This emphasises the need for 
security awareness and training to be given continuously to all 
employees, as opposed to just giving it to newcomers. 
3.2.3 Institutional embeddedness 
This refers to the organisations (e.g. employee’s company, ethics 
committees, or consumer rights groups) or institutions (e.g. law) 
that have the power to sanction untrustworthy behaviour or 
behaviour that is below expectations. Here the significant factor 
for engaging in a trust relationship is governed by the type, 
strictness and severity of punishment. This type of sanctioning is 
governed by strict rules defining what the institutions’ 
expectations are in a given situation. An example of this could be 
the threat of being excluded from a professional group as a result 
of objectionable behaviour under a given code of practice. 
This type of deterrence is currently the most widely used means 
of assuring compliance to the security policy. However, [25] 
points out that this is currently often ineffective because those in 
executive positions fail to comply with security policies. High-
level managers often feel their time is too valuable to comply 
with ‘petty’ security regulations.  The effect is that other 
employees will not interpret breaking of security policies as a 
breach of the trust that the organisation places in them. 
Futhermore, imposing sanction on some members of an 
organisation, but not on others, prevents the development of a 
shared set of values that could foster a better security culture, 
and thus increase dependability. 
3.3 Trust vs. Reliance 
In trust exchanges, trustors do not expect their vulnerabilities to 
be exploited, but they are usually aware that they are taking a 
risk, and balance this against the expected benefits.  After 
several successful exchanges, however, trustors develop an 
expectation that the trustee is reliable.  The distinction is 
important because once a trustor comes to rely rather than trust, 
the awareness of risk is lowered.  Some attacks on the human 
element in secure systems exploit this by inducing reliance 
through repeated trust exchanges, and attacking once reliance is 
established.  One example are attacks on reputation systems of 
internet auction sites, when dishonest traders build a positive 
reputation through a series of low-value exchanges, and then 
default on subsequent higher-value ones.  Another strategy is to 
impersonate a trustee on whom the trustor has come to rely. 
Phishing attacks exploit reliance by setting up web sites that look 
similar to ones that the target is familiar with, using similar 
URLs or symbols. The oldest attack to harvest login credentials 
replicated the login screen, and skimming attacks on cash 
dispensers also exploit the reliance customers have placed on 
these machines. 
Security designers need to be aware that certain familiar cues 
will induce reliance and trigger habitual responses in people. If 
organisations employ such clues, they need to be difficult to fake.  
Security awareness campaigns can sensitise people, and training 
can improve their ability to recognise such attacks.  With the 
increasing sophistication of attacks, however, mutual 
authentication is likely to become the only effective 
countermeasure for preventing people from falling prey to 
impostors. 
3.4 Assurance vs. Trust 
Assurance consists of the contextual factors that organisations 
can put in place to ensure a specific outcome to a trust exchange. 
These are currently mainly restricted to detecting and sanctioning 
undesirable behaviour. Trust on the other hand is based on an 
understanding of the intrinsic properties that pertain to a given 
actor. In high-security environments, organisations seek to 
establish whether an actor is intrinsically trustworthy by 
conducting background checks. These are intended to determine 
whether the actor has any past evidence of law-breaking, 
indicative of individuals whose integrity may be less than 
satisfactory. These investigations focus on past behaviour; the 
discussion in section 3.1.4 highlights that the analysis of an 
individual’s internalised norms may give some clues as to how 
likely they are to break trust, and thus to their dependability. 
As stated by [21], organisations are more productive if they have 
social capital [19] – i.e. trust that is based on shared informal 
norms that promote cooperation [9]. Some authors claim that 
reported failures of systems to yield the expected productivity 
gains in organisations [14] partially stems from a reduction in 
opportunities to build social capital [20].  
Currently, security policies are generally designed to encourage 
actions that can be readily interpreted as untrusting. For 
example, refusing to share a password with a colleague, locking 
your computer screen or checking the credentials of a technician 
are all signs of distrust in any usual setting and are considered to 
be basic security practices. As discussed in section 3.1.4, it is 
important to de-personalise this interpretation and replace it with 
an understanding of organisational assets and security 
requirements. 
The design of current secure systems rarely considers the need 
for – or existence of – trust between the different operators 
running the system. The attitude that prevails in system design is 
that the operator of the system must and will perform a task, with 
little to no thought going into how this will affect him in the 
wider context of his organisation. Ignoring this issue can damage 
the formation of social capital in the organisation, or even 
provide a means of forming social capital through the breaking of 
security practices, i.e. employees bonding together in the 
knowledge that everyone is breaking the rules with them. 
For example, it may be that for confidentiality purposes a 
medical data provider has specified a policy that separates 
different kinds of medical data (i.e. general health, sexual health, 
aids, cancer, etc.) and restricts access to these. There are cases 
where a particular organisation has a number of different projects 
utilising these resources, all needing different access privileges 
so as not to be given unnecessary information. This can put that 
particular organisation in a position where the different projects 
combined have access to all areas of information from the 
provider, yet the policy is designed to prevent some projects from 
accessing parts of this information. So, although the organisation 
as a whole is trusted with the totality of the confidential medical 
information, the policy requirements result in particular 
individuals being allowed more access than others. Lacking any 
justification for this measure, this can be interpreted as a lack of 
trust of an organisation in its employees, as well as resulting in 
increasing the administration costs of maintaining the access 
control mechanism. 
4. ANALYSING TRUST AND SECURITY 
4.1 Where Trust and Security meet 
The role of security in an organisation is to dependably handle 
the threats to the assets of that organisation. In order to do this, 
both technical and social countermeasures are necessary, and 
ensuring that these countermeasures are actually applied is of 
equal importance. Many organisations hold the misconception 
that security is best achieved if there is no need to trust any of 
the employees within the organisation, because the rules and 
procedures in place would be sufficiently reliable as to avoid any 
risk of employees acting undesirably.  
Well-defined, repetitive and predictable tasks, lend themselves 
well to creating and enforcing a policy that compels employees to 
apply security, whilst preventing them from abusing the system. 
A good example of this can be seen in the banking sector which 
has evolved a vast number of procedures, both technical and 
social, to prevent employees from stealing money. The 
disadvantage of using these types of contextual measures is that 
it takes away a lot of flexibility, makes organisations slow to 
respond to new situations, and is a costly means of operating. 
In areas where job requirements are vague, or there is a specific 
need for flexibility, these kinds of rigid policies cannot be made 
to work because they are too complex, constraining or expensive. 
In these cases, the only available option is to choose, encourage 
and trust employees to behave in a secure manner, rather than 
enforce it. This can also be complemented by monitoring in order 
to detect whether employees are actually complying with the 
policy. 
4.2 Breaking Trust 
As we have seen in section 3, security policies can require people 
to behave in a manner that is bound to be interpreted as not 
trusting others. For example, a trustor requires a trustee to 
divulge his password in order to allow the trustor to finish some 
urgent work. In this exchange the motivation for the trustor to 
engage in this trust relationship is that he has a high potential 
benefit –  i.e. finishing the urgent work – and the other options 
are more inconvenient and time-consuming – getting his 
password reset or reissued. 
The trustee has the ability to divulge his password, and may feel 
benevolent which may influence him to choose to divulge in 
order to help a colleague. On the other hand the trustee may have 
a degree of integrity that prevents him from behaving in such a 
way as to disobey the security policy. The motivation to refuse or 
accept to share the password is also affected by external factors. 
Expectations of future involvement may tip the balance in favour 
of breaking the security, since it is very likely that the trustee 
will interact again with the trustor as they are colleagues. The 
trustor may also be a part of a larger group of colleagues and in 
cases where security is not important to this social group, they 
might give the trustee a bad reputation or affect the relationships 
between him and the group should he decide to refuse. The final 
factor is the degree to which the organisation detects and 
punishes transgressions and rewards good behaviour. 
Should the trustee refuse to violate the security policy, unless the 
trustor understands and agrees with the motivation to do so, he 
may feel untrusted and untrustworthy, which can create tensions 
between the two actors, and will definitely hinder the creation of 
Design principle Description Relevant Property 
Simplifying security  Make the task of behaving securely easier through 
better tools and simpler interfaces but also through 
simple policy rules – exceptions to the rules can be 
sources of confusion and abuse.  
Ability 
Motivation (other options) 
Promoting a security culture 
 
A security culture should be encouraged by 
ensuring that the security policy is neither 
excessive (i.e. for every countermeasure there is a 
corresponding threat) nor unfair (i.e. the boss is 
allowed to avoid security measures). 
In addition to this monitoring and checks should be 
made regularly to ensure the policy is in use, 
transgressions are detected and punished according 
to a published code of conduct, and secure 




Motivation (avoiding punishment, 
benefiting from reward) 
Participative Security In situations where a decision has to be made as to 
what security countermeasures to adopt, involving 
the relevant stakeholders in the decision making 
process may improve the feeling of trust from the 
organisation and the motivation to apply the 
resulting countermeasures. 
Ability (Improved knowledge of security) 




Specifically grouping people into security groups, 
together with their own responsibilities and 
rewards can make security a more immediate 
concern for employees. By making the groups 
smaller expectations of future interactions are 
greatly increased, thus harnessing that particular 
factor. 
Ability 




Educating employees about security By providing employees with training as to what is 
expected and required and what are the threats. 
Ability 
Motivation (Perception of Risk) 
Benevolence 
Table 2. Principles for fostering dependable behaviour from the social elements of a secure system 
social capital. In this case three trust signals can positively 
influence the adherence to the security policy without harming 
the trust relationship between both actors: 
 Providing an alternative to initiating the trust 
exchange in the first place. This can be done by 
giving the trustor an easy way of accessing the 
systems he needs, for example by reissuing his 
password in a timely manner or providing a limited 
access based on a temporary password and 
monitoring the activity of the trustor. This is the 
kind of approach that HCISec is trying to achieve by 
making it easier to use secure systems. 
 Having a security conscious culture within the peer 
group. Both actors can relate to this, even if they do 
not overtly recognise it (i.e. if everyone is careful 
with their passwords and refuses to divulge them, 
then the peer pressure to behave in the same way is 
significant). 
 Ensuring that the detection and punishment for 
breaking the security rules are effective. Very 
stringent enforcement of security policies will result 
in adherence to the policy. This is a very 
straightforward means of preventing rule breaking 
because it is easily understood by both trustor and 
trustee, who have a lot more to lose than gain. 
In banking, the stringent security measures in place do not create 
tensions amongst staff because it is well understood that the 
detection and punishment for a transgression is taken very 
seriously. This in turn can foster an environment where no one 
breaks the rules, thereby reinforcing the motivation to avoid 
transgression. Stringent enforcement can only happen in areas 
where the expectations are as well defined as the punishments. 
As we have seen above, the disadvantage of this approach is that 
it stifles flexibility and this makes it inappropriate for a 
significant number of jobs that require security. 
4.3 Middle Ground 
As seen in section 3, there are two extremes of security: 
 Assurance: complete control over what employees must 
and can’t do, together with stringent enforcement. 
 Trust: no control over what employees can do, and only 
trust and encouragement for them to behave in a secure 
manner. 
The problems start to occur when trying to secure a system that 
exists in the middle ground of being able to support well-defined 
security policies, whilst still requiring a degree of flexibility. In 
cases like this, where the security policy in place is either not 
well-defined (in order to maintain flexibility), it is essential that 
the enforcement of that policy be both strictly specified and 
applied to everyone in the organisation.  In addition, it is 
essential to foster an environment which encourages employees 
to behave in a trustworthy manner. Table 2 describes a set of 
design principles that make use of the trust warranting factors 
identified in section 3. 
Following our presentation and analysis of the factors influencing 
trust in secure systems, we believe further research in this area 
would undoubtedly yield greater insights into secure socio-
technical system design. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Getting a secure system to behave dependably is a complex task. 
Assurance mechanisms can achieve a degree of success, but in 
most real-world situations, organisations either cannot afford the 
costs of maintaining such a stringent system, or need to be 
flexible. This means that these systems have to rely on people 
behaving in a secure manner. We have looked at the field of trust 
and identified a number of factors that affect an individual’s 
propensity to behave in a trustworthy manner. We are convinced 
that these factors can be applied to improving the dependability 
of an individual’s security behaviour, and have presented a 
number of design principles aimed at addressing this. 
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